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REMARKS AGAINST FOUNDATIONAL CTIVITY 
BY GERALD SACKS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY & M,I,T, 
I want to discourage people -- mathematicians and others -- 
from trying to build foundations for all of mathematics. There 
is no need for such an enterprise. Moreover, any such attempt 
is bound to assume a negative puritanical flavor: “don’ t do 
this”; “you can’t do that”; etc. Puritanism is not fruitful 
for mathematics. 
However, foundational activity is of interest in some limited 
spheres. For example, when there were difficulties in set theory, 
a few small changes were needed to straighten things out. There 
were difficulties, but not paradoxes; there was no need to write 
Principia Mathematics to straighten them out. It was necessary 
to clarify ideas -- and that is when foundational activity is 
of interest. Another example is category theory in logic. 
(Reference is being made to the new theory of “topoi”, developed 
by Lawvere and others. The role of category theory in logic is 
not to be confused with its role in mathematics, as described 
for example in S. MacLane, Categories for the Working Mathematician, 
Springer, 1971.) There are a number of paradoxical constructions 
which can probably be straightened out by a minimal effort. There 
is no need to write down axioms for category theory. 
Foundational activities should be very narrow, very restrained. 
They should be geared to solve the difficulties at hand. Since 
there have not yet been any substantial paradoxes, there has not 
yet been any need for a wider sphere of foundational activity. 
For example, there were confusions, not paradoxes, in late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century mathematics, despite all 
claims to the contrary. 
There are no substantial paradoxes in the history of mathem- 
atics. Sometimes results are called paradoxes, but not for long. 
For example, the Banach-Tarski paradox is actually just a theorem. 
[Or consider eighteenth century geometry and Kramer’s paradox -- 
interjected by Dieudonn6.1 When one called these paradoxes, one 
simply meant that the conclusion was startling, e.g. Peano’s 
paradox of the space-filling curve. After a while such results 
become accepted, and don’t seem nearly so strange. 
Most mathematical logicians today are not interested in 
foundations. They are more interested in seeing what ideas from 
mathematical logic can be applied to other areas of mathematics. 
These days mathematical logic is a peripheral field of mathematics, 
and its utility is in its applicability to the more central fields. 
However, that may change. 
A good example of this is the work of Abraham Robinson. He 
was aware of the foundational problems and discussed them with 
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various people. Yet if one peruses his publications, one will 
find few investigations of such problems. Instead one finds an 
interest in applications of logic to certain problems in algebra 
and analysis. And one of his final interests was applying his 
notion of nonstandard analysis to algebraic number theory. 
You can think of Robinson’s work in nonstandard analysis as 
foundational if you like, namely, as an alternative foundation 
of analysis. However I am convinced that this was not his 
motivation at all. His interest in nonstandard analysis lay in 
its applications to classical analysis. His idea was to get new 
theorems for classical analysis by looking at classical problems 
in a slightly different way. His approach has been fairly 
successful. For example, for quite a few years the most useful 
way of considering the invariant subspace problem was through 
nonstandard analysis, even though this approach has been recently 
superseded. Also, there are applications of nonstandard analysis 
to mathematical economics, unexpected as they may be. 
There are many other examples of the sorts of services that 
logic can provide to other fields of mathematics. One of the most 
paradigmatic is due to a result of Gddel. GUdel defined a certain 
class of statements which, if provable using the Axiom of Choice, 
would be provable without the Axiom of Choice. Logic is needed to 
make precise just what this class of statements is. One consequence 
is that if you could prove the Riemann hypothesis using the Axiom of 
Choice (there is no reason to believe that you can), you could prove 
it without the Axiom of Choice. This method due to Gbdel was 
actually used in a paper by Ax and Kochen [a], although a direct 
method was eventually found to reprove their result without the 
Axiom of Choice and without GtJdel’s method. 
Also exemplary of the use of logic in other fields of math- 
ematics is its use in making sense of Lefschetz’s Principle and 
the idea of a universal domain. Essentially, Lefschetz’s 
Principle [b] says that any algebraically closed field of character- 
istic zero and of infinite transcendence rank is as good as any 
other as far as algebraic geometry is concerned, i.e. if you 
can prove a statement over one of these fields, it is true over 
all others. Attempts have been made by Feferman and, more 
recently, by Barwise to make sense of this notion, by defining 
a broad class of statements (including all those relevant to 
algebraic geometry) which are based on Lefschetz’s Principle. 
Although there haven’t been any substantial paradoxes in 
mathematics, there have been errors. It is important that 
histories of mathematics be written which discuss real, substantial 
errors made by mathematicians! A classic example is related to 
a mistake made by Lebesgue when he tried to show that the projection 
of any Bore1 set in the plane on the line is Borel. The motivation 
behind this was to show that the projection of a Bore1 set is 
measurable -- which, of course, it is, but by a more intricate 
argument. The error was in print for 10 or 12 years before it 
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was discovered by Souslin [c]. This led to the definition of 
analytic set and to the development of descriptive set theory. 
Histories of mathematical logic should be wary of over-stressing 
foundational aspects, although the various attempts to erect 
foundational systems should be included. 
The axiomatic aspects of mathematical logic has encouraged 
clarity and precision to a dangerous degree. The attempt to 
provide maximum precision has a killing effect upon mathematics. 
Clarity should come at the end, not at the beginning of a math- 
ematical endeavor. Consider Euler's discovery of all the integral 
solutions to the equation x3 = y2 + 2. This was accomplished 
with an argument which must have been incomprehensible, if not 
meaningless, to most people of his time. As Dieudonne points 
out, Euler himself did not know what he was doing when he broke 
expressions into complex factors. Students today are discouraged 
from proceeding as Euler did. Too often, they are unwilling to 
move from one point to the next until they have painfully 
analyzed the minutiae of each argument. The effect is altogether 
too often, a long and uninspired thesis. 
NOTES 
a. Annals of Math. 83 (1966), 437-56. 
b. AS formulated in A. Weil, Foundations of Algebraic 
Geometry, Am. Math. Sot., 1946. 
c. H. Lebesgue, M. Souslin, C.R. Paris 164 (1917), 88-; 
N. Lusin, Fund. Math. 10 (1927), l-95. 
DISCUSSION 
Dreben: Sacks is right in saying that mathematical logic 
today is no longer concerned with foundations in the traditional 
sense, and has not been since World War II. Sacks might have 
misled some people, however, into thinking that the reason Russell 
and Whitehead wrote Principia Mathematics was primarily because 
of the paradoxes. That is not true: The reason that Russell 
and Whitehead, or Frege, or their immediate followers engaged in 
this type of enterprise was not in trying to do mathematics per 
se, but because they had a very general philosophical conception 
and enterprise (although I don't agree with it). The form that 
Principia Mathematics took was because of the paradoxes; this 
was the reason for the theory of types. But the reason behind 
Principia Mathematics, or much that is of interest in it was not 
the result of such paradoxes. This is important. 
These are called paradoxes -- and not contradictions -- 
because most people see what Sacks was saying, i.e. they are 
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genuine mathematical results in set theory. What is somewhat 
misleading is the view -- a view currently held by many logicians - 
that there never was any real problem in Cantorian set theory, 
because set theorists are talking about the iterative notion of a 
set (the notion that you start at the bottom.and build up) first 
made explicit by Von Neumann. This iterative notion underlies 
the contemporary view of set theory. 
The truth is, as GOdel has pointed out, that there are really 
two basic notions of set. There is the logical notion of a set; 
not in the narrow sense of mathematics but in the broad sense 
that Frege and Russell intended it to be used. This is a contin- 
uation of the medieval idea of the extension of a predicate. Then 
there is the iterative notion of set, implicit in Cantor and used 
in mathematical work. This notion never had any troubles in it. 
GUdel thinks we still don’t fully understand the logical notion 
of set. 
Moore: (to Sacks) You had said there have been no real, sub- 
stantial paradoxes in the history of mathematics. What would 
constitute a real paradox? 
Dreben: That’s a contradiction in terms. 
Sacks: I think it would have to have the nature of an exper- 
ience that every mathematician has at least once a year, that of 
proving a theorem one day and refuting it the next day. Like 
this -- except that nobody can find any mistakes in either the 
proof or the refutation. It might mean we would have to retreat 
in our mathematics to a level where the paradox does not appear. 
Kline: I believe that historically you are incorrect. The 
word “paradox ” does mean a seeming contradiction which has been 
resolved. But paradoxes like Russell’s class of all classes or 
the Richard paradox were genuine contradictions as far as the 
mathematicians were then concerned. They used the “paradox” to 
ease their troubled souls because the word “paradox” implied 
that they were going to resolve the problems. 
Dreben: We should make this clear. The Russell paradox, the 
Richard paradox, the Burali-Forti paradox -- these are all logical 
contradictions. Up until the turn of the century, up until the 
statement of the paradoxes, people talked of wanting to have a 
general logic. Even mathematicians of the first rank like Zermelo, 
those building axiom systems, were under the illusion that their 
work was connected with general logical investigations. Zermelo 
and even Von Neumann in his 1925 paper say explicitly that the 
only justification for his setting of the axioms is that they 
make the paradoxes appear not to exist. Von Neumann, and probably 
Zermelo, knew that you could have a working set theory based on 
the iterative notion of set (cumulative type theory) in which 
there is no contradiction. This is what underlies Von Neumann’s 
proof that the axiom of foundation is consistent with the other 
axioms of set theory. This is such a powerful notion that all 
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young people in mathematical logic today take it for granted that 
this is what set theory is about. 
These two notions of set come together in working set theory 
although they should be kept separate. Yet, as Gndel pointed 
out in his 1947 paper [Cl01 , there never have been any contradictions 
in the mathematical notion of set. 
Dieudonh: What caused people to think of the set of all sets? 
Dreben: About 1899, Cantor probably had two notions of set 
theory : absolutist set theory, which is what we have in mind when 
we think of sets as extensions of predicates, and cumulative set 
theory which could be done just for mathematical purposes. It 
was the absolutist notion that would lead to the paradoxes. 
Von Neumann (1925) says that some omission is essential to 
avoid the paradoxes; what that omission is, is arbitrary. He 
was the first to formulate the cumulative notion of set explicitly 
[c31, vol. 1, 35-57; Cll, pp. 393-413-J. 
. . . Mr. Bishop is engaged in foundational work, a reconstruction 
of mathematics with some picture in mind. Proof theory is not this. 
Kline: What was the purpose of Hilbert’s work if not to prove 
consistency? Reconstruction would have been useless to Hilbert 
if he had not had his Beweistheorie (proof theory). 
Dreben: The original motivation for proof theory was to prove 
the consistency of a formalization of mathematics, but after Gbdel 
that kind of motivation was pre-empted. But this does not stop 
proof theory from being interesting. 
Kline: Thus, we must distinguish between proof theory before 
and after Glldel. 
Dreben: Mathematical logic grew out of philosophical purposes, 
but it is absolutely essential to realize that even though people 
use the same words, e.g. “foundations”, they may mean entirely 
different things by them today and have entirely different purposes. 
Putnam: There are still conceptual problems with the math- 
ematical, cumulative notion of a set. The problem of a working 
set theorist is this: he wants to have things both ways. At 
that point, you are right back in the Russell paradox. There 
was a good discussion of this at the May meeting of the American 
Philosophical Society, to be published in NOUS. There is still 
a vestige of the paradox hanging over the mathematical notion of 
a set, although it does not threaten contradiction. 
Dieudonn6: For example, when one is talking about an arbitrary 
group, he tends to think of the set of all groups. But it is just 
an illusion that you must talk of this “large” set (of all groups). 
Birkhoff: Weierstrass provides a good example of the good 
influence of precision coming at the end of a mathematical devel- 
opment . Here precision seemed to crystallize analysis. 
Also, constructive proof is better than non-constructive 
proof, other considerations aside. It would be of service, and 
not much effort, to indicate whether proofs are constructive or 
need be non-constructive. I still feel uneasy about the Banach- 
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Tarski decomposition; the “components It defined (non-constructively) 
just do not seem very meaningful. 
In response to Birkhoff’s comments, Sacks said that in closely 
following GEIdel he represents the majority view. Birkhoff agreed. 
Dieudonng: Since Cohen’s work, we have as many different 
mathematics as we want, for we have as many choices of alephs 
for the continuum as we want... [Ed.: His implication seems to 
be that this freedom of choice makes the resulting theories not 
very meaningful. ] 
Kahane: Hausdorff mixed his set theory with measure theory 
and topology. For his predecessors, set theory was the study 
of linear sets. When did the change come so that the study of 
abstract sets became part of mathematics? 
Sacks: Cantor speaks of quite arbitrary sets (absolute, 
general sets). Dreben and Browder added that, in a general work- 
ing sense, it was in FrBchet’s Thesis (1906) that abstract spaces 
were first studied, and that he had applications to functional 
analysis in mind. [See Part E of the Proceedings.] 
May: To clarify the discussion, we should distinguish the 
question as to when certain individuals thought of sets and spaces 
abstractly from the question as to when the idea of considering 
abstract topological spaces and measure spaces became generally 
diffused. Widespread diffusion of the abstract approach may not 
have come until the 1920’s. 
The discussion concluded with an exchange of views between 
Profs. May and Dieudonnd concerning a point made by Sacks: that 
axiomatization often comes late in the historical development 
of a subject. The following is a statement of consensus written 
by the editor. 
Sacks’assertion was notably true of Euclidean geometry and 
group theory. Likewise, Boolean algebra was decades old before 
it became axiomatized, first incompletely by C.S. Peirce and 
then almost too completely by E. Schrllder. ( In a fruitful 
compromise, Dedkind used variants of the axioms of Boolean 
algebra to define lattices, modular lattices, and distributive 
lattices.) But by itself, axiomatization usually contributes 
more to the precise formulation of a theory than to its devel- 
opment . Carried to excess, it may even tend to make a subject 
seem moribund, though it certainly did not do this to the theory 
of finite groups! What seems to be true is that, for an axiom 
system to have continuing interest, it must have many variants, 
each with important realizations. (Bourbaki sometimes refers 
to the mathematical structures which, dually, satisfy several 
axiom sys terns, as “mother structures” .) Axiomatization also 
makes it possible to synthesize whole theories of mathematics 
from a few basic ingredients. Once such a synthesis has taken 
place, however, its fundamental concepts tend to become static. 
